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FUTURE NAVIES—PRESENT ISSUES
Jane G. Dalton
The U.S. Navy is transforming itself to deal with a wider range of missionsthan the traditional blue-water, major combat operations that it has tradi-
tionally been equipped to handle.1 That emerging transformation has resulted
in a number of new programs, technologies, and strategies that raise interesting,
and sometimes complex, legal issues. Lawyers advising the Navy’s leadership
through this transformational process are analyzing these legal issues now, in
the present, to ensure that the future U.S. Navy is properly, and legally, orga-
nized, trained, and equipped. This article will address five topics of interest for
naval planners and legal advisers who are building the Navy of the future.
CIVILIAN MARINERS AND SEA BASING
The U.S. Navy currently maintains a force of approximately 550,000 full-time
employees, about 35 percent of whom are civilians. At any given time, 130-plus
of the Navy’s 283 ships are under way, about 45 percent of the total ship inven-
tory.2 In 2004 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), then Admiral Vern Clark,
directed the Navy to maximize capabilities, minimize payroll, improve produc-
tivity, and eliminate unnecessary billets.3 One way to meet those goals is to re-
move sailors from billets that have little to do with war fighting and replace them
with civilians. At sea, for instance, sailors cut hair, serve meals, maintain the en-
gineering plant, chip paint—all tasks that civilians are equally capable of per-
forming, and in fact do perform at commands ashore. Placing civilians on
warships to perform those functions is a logical extension of the CNO’s guid-
ance and would free sailors for combat-related activities.
Accordingly, one of the Navy’s answers to the CNO’s challenge is an experi-
mental program to place federal civil-service mariners on board warships. These
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mariners perform tasks naval personnel have traditionally performed on board
warships but that civilians have performed on board naval auxiliary vessels for
decades and on board merchant vessels for centuries—navigation, engineering,
and deck seamanship. For example, in early 2005 USS Mount Whitney (LCC/
JCC 20) deployed to the European theater as the new U.S. Sixth Fleet and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command ship.4 One of the most sophis-
ticated command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I)
ships ever commissioned, Mount Whitney today is manned by a composite crew
of 157 U.S. Navy sailors and 143 civilian mariners employed by the Military
Sealift Command. These three hundred personnel represent a reduction of 276
from the previous all-active-duty Navy crew. “By supplementing the crew with
civilian mariners,” the Sixth Fleet Public Affairs Office reports, “the Navy is op-
erating the command ship at a reduced cost and employing captured uniformed
personnel billets on forward combatant vessels.”5 Mount Whitney will be en-
gaged in NATO exercises and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean maritime
operations and will be available as a command and control ship for combat op-
erations if required.
The Navy is simultaneously pursuing the concept of “sea basing” as a trans-
formational initiative. Sea basing is the Navy’s answer to the concern that access
to bases in foreign territory will be less predictable and more ad hoc than in the
past. This concern is not an idle or speculative one, as evidenced by Turkey’s re-
fusal during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to permit the 4th Infantry Division to
cross Turkish territory into northern Iraq.
The sea base is envisioned as a system of systems—a flotilla of ships serving
collectively as a staging and sustainment area from which ground forces can
launch attacks ashore in a nonpermissive environment—sometimes referred to
as “forcible entry operations.” Though no one knows exactly what the sea base
will look like in any detail, it will probably consist of a “network of ships that
would provide artillery fire, air support, supplies and a secure home for troops
fighting on land.”6 The primary components of the sea base could include the
Maritime Prepositioning Force–Future (MPF-F) cargo ship, the next-generation
destroyer (DDX), the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and the Amphibious Assault
Ship (LHA-R), in conjunction with existing guided-missile cruisers and de-
stroyers, aircraft carriers, and submarines.7
Of particular interest for this discussion is the role of the MPF-F cargo ship.
The MPF-F is designed as the replacement for today’s logistics-force cargo ships
and would act as a floating logistics center. One report notes that it would be
“nearly as large as an aircraft carrier” and would “accommodate heavy-lift heli-
copters and perhaps cargo planes as large as the Air Force’s C-130. It would be
able to move supplies and equipment to those aircraft and other ships while at
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sea.”8 Another report, however, depicts a role directly involved in combat opera-
tions. It refers to the MPF-F as a replacement for the big-deck Tarawa-class am-
phibious assault ships, describing it as a “fighting logistics ship with a flight deck
big enough to send hundreds of Marines ashore in rotorcraft and launch Joint
Strike Fighters.”9
If the MPF-F is manned as prepositioning ships are today, its crew will consist
entirely of civilian mariners. There is no legal prohibition against manning na-
val auxiliaries, such as oilers, ammunition ships, supply ships, and pre-
positioning ships, with civilians. In fact, these seamen have a recognized status
under the Geneva Conventions as
“civilians accompanying the force”
and are entitled to prisoner-of-
war status if captured.10 Issues
arise, however, if the MPF-F is
indeed to become part of the
“assault echelon”—if Marines or soldiers actually launch from the ship into
combat operations ashore. Similar issues will arise if USS Mount Whitney, with
its hybrid crew, is employed as a C4I platform in an armed conflict.
The issues that arise are twofold. First, under conventional and customary
international law, a warship is manned by a crew under regular armed forces dis-
cipline. Second, civilians who assist in operating and maintaining a warship en-
gaged in international armed conflict might be viewed as participating actively
or directly in hostilities and thus as having lost their protected status as civilians
accompanying the force. These two issues will be addressed in turn.
Article 29 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and article
8 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas identify warships by four characteris-
tics: they belong to the armed forces of a state; they bear external marks distin-
guishing warships of their nationality; they are commanded by officers who
have been duly commissioned by the government of the state and whose names
appear in the appropriate service lists or equivalents; and they are manned by
crews under regular armed forces discipline.11 These characteristics originated
in the 1856 Declaration of Paris, which abolished privateering, and Hague Con-
vention VII, which established the conditions for converting merchant ships
into warships.12 The rules served to distinguish bona fide warships from priva-
teers, which operated from motives of personal gain, by clearly establishing that
the warships operate on behalf of a state. They also furthered the requirement in
Hague VII that warships are to observe the laws and customs of war. These four
characteristics are so universally identified with warships throughout the world
that they may be said to have attained the status of customary international law.
D A L T O N 1 9
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Left undefined, however, is what the phrase “manned by a crew” actually
means in practice. Many U.S. Navy warships today have civilians on board in a
variety of capacities—as technical representatives, science advisers, contractors.
Under customary practice, warships have long carried civilians on board. In the
War of 1812, for example, Commodore Stephen Decatur’s ship, the frigate
United States, embarked female contract nurses to care for the sick and
wounded.13 The mere presence of small numbers of civilians clearly does not de-
prive a warship of its status as a warship. But the issue takes on greater meaning
if a third or half of a warship’s complement is composed of civilians who, though
subject to a civilian disciplinary system, are not subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.14 There is no “bright line” rule that determines what percentage
of a warship’s crew should be active-duty sailors, but it is fair to say that the
greater the percentage of civilians on board performing functions traditionally
accomplished by sailors, the less likely that the warship will be able to maintain
swift and effective discipline over its entire complement. Inability to discipline a
crew effectively calls into question the ship’s ability to “observe the laws and cus-
toms of war” as required by Hague VII.
The first issue concerning civilian mariners, then, implicates the warship’s
ability to meet its international obligation to observe the laws and customs of
war and to satisfy the criteria established for warships in conventional and cus-
tomary law. The second issue is related to the civilian mariners themselves and
their status if they are captured. One of the basic principles of the law of armed
conflict is that of “distinction”—that is, combatants and noncombatants must
be distinguished so as to spare noncombatants as much as possible from the exi-
gencies of war.15 A corollary of the basic principle is that noncombatants (civil-
ians) enjoy protections under the law of armed conflict unless and until they
take a direct or active part in hostilities.16 Civilians accompanying the force cer-
tainly assume the risk of becoming casualties of war through proximity to mili-
tary operations. For example, civilian mariners manning oilers replenishing
warships at sea are aware that the platforms on which they serve are legitimate
military objectives. The mariners themselves, however, retain their status as
“persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members
thereof.” They carry identification cards reflecting their authority to accompany
the force, and as noted, they are entitled to prisoner-of-war status if captured.17
However, questions could be raised as to their status if they are employed on
board a warship engaged in combat operations. Unfortunately, there is no au-
thoritative definition of “direct” or “active” participation in hostilities.18 Purely
collateral duties, such as cutting hair, running the ship’s store, or performing
other housekeeping functions, may contribute to the quality of life on board the
warship, but they are not necessary to its combat effectiveness. On the other end
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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of the spectrum, firing weapons, maintaining weapons systems, or serving as
members of boarding parties are more akin to actual participation. Running the
engineering plant, navigating the ship, and operating small boats or cranes
could be considered collateral functions, or they could be considered actual
participation.
A sailor who needs a haircut can man the weapons systems or serve in a
boarding party; however, a ship that is not within its assigned Tomahawk
land-attack missile “launch basket” or is not properly heading into the wind for
the launch of fighter aircraft cannot perform its combat function. Further, the
warship itself is a weapons system, and its full complement is required if that sys-
tem is to be effective. Civilian engineers running the propulsion plant, naviga-
tors plotting the ship’s position and movement, and technicians working on the
missile system all contribute to war-fighting effectiveness. It is difficult to argue
that any of these civilians are not contributing integrally to the combat func-
tions of the ship. It is conceivable that an opposing belligerent in an interna-
tional armed conflict could perceive them, particularly those engaged in
engineering, navigation, and deck seamanship, as taking active and direct parts
in hostilities. That same enemy belligerent would be unlikely to grant the civil-
ian mariners combatant immunity and might choose to prosecute them for
murder, arson, or other violations of the belligerent’s domestic law.
The above discussion posits the most extreme examples. To date, the only
warships manned with civilian mariners have been designated command and
control platforms, such as USS Mount Whitney. The MPF-F ships are still in the
planning stages, and it has not been determined exactly how they will be em-
ployed in the sea-basing construct. As the Navy continues its transformational
efforts, however, there will no doubt be continued pressure to contract out, or
seek civilian substitution for, more and more administrative and support func-
tions in order to free active-duty sailors for actual combat duties.
To address both issues raised by the potential “civilianization” of warship
crews, the Navy has proposed legislation that would create a five-year pilot pro-
gram under which civilian mariners employed by the Navy would affiliate with a
special reserve component.19 If the legislation is enacted, mariners will remain
civilian federal employees unless their ships are ordered into combat operations
in international armed conflict, at which time they would be ordered to active
duty. In their active-duty status, the mariners will be subject to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, thus making the entire crew subject to armed forces
discipline. Further, if captured, they would be members of the active-duty force,
entitled as such not only to prisoner-of-war status but also to combatant immu-
nity for any belligerent acts in which the warship had engaged. There may be
other ways to approach the international law concerns raised by placing hybrid
D A L T O N 2 1
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crews on warships, but the proposed legislation is attractive in that it resolves
both issues satisfactorily and provides the civilian mariners with the highest de-
gree of protection under international law in the event they are captured during
belligerent operations.
UNMANNED AERIAL AND UNDERWATER SYSTEMS
In April 2005, General John Jumper, U.S. Air Force, reported that there were over
750 unmanned aerial vehicles operating in Iraq.20 At about the same time, the
U.S. Navy deployed its first operational unmanned undersea vehicle, the Remote
Minehunting System (RMS), to identify and chart suspicious objects in Khwar
Abd Allah Channel at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.21 Most are familiar today with
the use of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle as a precision weapon in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Yemen.22 There is talk of a future unmanned aerial system that
would track and engage targets without a “man in the loop.”23 The relative low
cost, ease of transport, technological sophistication, and ability to operate with-
out a crew combine to make unmanned systems the surveillance platform and
weapon of choice for the foreseeable future;24 this approach may extend even to
replacing F-16 and KC-135 aircraft in the Air Force inventory.25
The use of these unmanned systems, however, raises a primary legal issue:
Should these systems be treated under international law like their manned coun-
terparts—airplanes and submarines? For example, do the regimes of innocent
passage, straits-transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage apply to
them? Are they required to comply with “ColRegs,” the International Regula-
tions for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea? Do they enjoy sovereign immunity?
What is the legal framework for attacking an unmanned system? A complete de-
velopment of these questions is beyond the scope of this article—each could be
the topic of a scholarly legal treatise—but some of the answers are fairly
intuitive.
Take, for example, a carrier strike group transiting the Strait of Hormuz and
employing an unmanned Scan Eagle intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance vehicle for a “channel sweep” mission.26 The Strait of Hormuz, as an inter-
national strait connecting the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the
Arabian Sea, is, along with its approaches, subject to the regime of straits-transit
passage throughout the strait.27 Under that regime, the right of all states to navi-
gation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious tran-
sit of the strait is unimpeded.28 While exercising the right of transit passage,
however, ships and aircraft “shall refrain from any activities other than those in-
cident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit.”29
Accordingly, in analyzing whether a carrier strike group may employ a recon-
naissance vehicle during straits-transit passage, the question is not whether
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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the vehicle is manned or unmanned but whether it is consistent with the
strike group’s “continuous and expeditious transit” in its “normal mode” of
operation.30 The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations pro-
vides that the normal mode of operation for surface ships includes “transit in a
manner consistent with sound navigational practices and the security of the force,
including formation steaming and the launching and recovery of aircraft.”31 The
San Remo Manual holds, in connection with straits-transit passage during
armed conflict, that belligerents “are permitted to take defensive measures con-
sistent with their security, including launching and recovery of aircraft, screen
formation steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance.”32
A Scan Eagle “channel sweep” is a surveillance mission for force protection
and navigational safety—normal operational concerns for all Navy vessels
wherever they are transiting and whether the transit is in peacetime, in a period
of heightened tensions, or during an armed conflict. The need for defensive,
force-protection measures
is particularly acute when
transiting in proximity to
land and in high-traffic areas,
such as straits, where an
“asymmetric” enemy (such as a terrorist) could strike without warning.33 Ac-
cordingly, employment of the Scan Eagle in a force-protection and safety-of-
navigation surveillance and reconnaissance mode is completely consistent with
the regime of straits-transit passage. The vehicle may be launched from the air-
craft carrier or another surface platform. An unmanned undersea vehicle could
operate for the same purposes submerged, if that is consistent with its normal
mode of operation. The same would apply if the strike group were operating in
archipelagic-sea-lanes transit through an archipelagic nation.
It must be noted, however, that the Scan Eagle is also an intelligence-gathering
platform. The rules concerning straits-transit passage provide that passage must
be, as we have seen, “solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious tran-
sit of the strait”;34 further, states are to “refrain from any activities other than
those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit un-
less rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.”35 States are also to refrain
from “the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any other manner in
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations.”36 Importantly, unlike the rules governing innocent passage
through territorial seas, intelligence gathering is not identified as inconsistent
with straits-transit passage. Indeed, some amount of photographic or electronic
intelligence gathering may inevitably occur incidental to the “channel sweep”
D A L T O N 2 3
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mission. That would not be inconsistent with the regime of transit passage since
the mission is related to safety of navigation and security of the force.37
Compare the transit-passage regime with that of innocent passage through
territorial seas. When engaged in innocent passage, submarines are required
to operate on the surface, and ships may not launch or recover aircraft or any
military device; further, any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice
of the defense or security of the coastal state is considered inconsistent with the
innocent passage regime.38 Accordingly, a carrier strike group engaged in inno-
cent passage could not launch or recover the Scan Eagle or the Remote Minehunt-
ing System underwater vehicle. Since there is no right of innocent passage through
a nation’s territorial airspace, an unmanned aircraft launched outside the territo-
rial sea would not be entitled to innocent passage over the territorial sea.
Consider, though, whether an unmanned undersea vehicle launched prior to
entry into the territorial sea is entitled to innocent passage on the surface, as
other submarines are. The Law of the Sea Convention provides that “ships of all
States . . . enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.”39 The
convention does not define “ship,” but it does define “warship” as “a ship be-
longing to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing
such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commis-
sioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropri-
ate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular
armed forces discipline.”40 Arguably, the RMS vehicle fits this definition if one
considers that the commanding officer of the ship from which it is launched is in
“command” of the RMS and the team remotely operating the vehicle is “man-
ning” it. In any event, the RMS does not have to be a warship to be entitled to in-
nocent passage, since the right applies to “ships” of all states. Webster’s II New
Riverside University Dictionary (1988) distinguishes between “ships”—rather
large vessels adapted for deep-water navigation—and “boats,” comparatively
small, usually open, craft. But Webster’s also notes that for legal purposes, a ship
is “a vessel intended for marine transportation, without regard to form, rig or
means of propulsion.” Arguably, then, an unmanned undersea vehicle, if it is
considered a ship, could engage in continuous, expeditious innocent passage,
provided it transited on the surface, showed its flag, and did not engage in intel-
ligence collection to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state.
A related issue is whether unmanned systems like the RMS are “vessels” that
must comply with the Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea. The ColRegs
apply to “all vessels on the high seas,”and they define “vessel”as including “every de-
scription of watercraft, including nondisplacement craft and seaplanes, used or ca-
pable of being used as a means of transportation on water.”41 The ColRegs
definition is also found in American statutes and is generally accepted in admiralty
2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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law.42 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on this subject and continues to expand the
type of watercraft encompassed by the term “vessel.”43 Though the Remote Mine-
hunting System is incapable of transporting people, it does carry a payload of sen-
sors, other instrumentation, and equipment; it has its own propulsion system
capable of driving it at speeds up to sixteen knots; and it can operate as far as four-
teen nautical miles from the launch platform.44 If the RMS and similar systems are
“vessels,” however, they must meet a number of design and operational require-
ments regarding such matters as lookouts, sound signals, lights, and dayshapes.45
Whether or not the RMS is required to comply with the ColRegs require-
ments, those in command of the launching platform and the unmanned system
have a duty to act with due regard for the safety of others on the high seas—a
duty imposed by both the ColRegs (Rule 2) and the Law of the Sea.46 The RMS is
currently equipped with a mast-mounted camera that allows the remote opera-
tor to avoid surface objects; forward-looking sonar to alert the operator to sub-
merged objects; and a mast-mounted strobe light to advise nearby vessels of its
presence. A radar reflector may also be mounted on the mast.47 The law on the
status of unmanned undersea systems is unsettled;48 the prudent course of ac-
tion for the U.S. Navy would be to ensure that these systems comply with all ap-
plicable ColRegs requirements or to obtain appropriate exemptions.
HOSPITAL SHIPS
Military hospital ships are granted extraordinary protection under the Second
Geneva Convention. Current technology and the threat of global terrorism,
however, pose two vexing problems for navies of the future.
Military hospital ships are those ships built and equipped solely to assist,
treat, and transport the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.49 They may “in no cir-
cumstances” be attacked or captured but shall “at all times be respected and pro-
tected,” provided that the parties to the conflict are notified of the names of the
ships and their descriptions ten days before they are employed.50 Hospital ships
are entitled to the aforementioned protections “unless they are used to commit . . .
acts harmful to the enemy.”51 The presence on board hospital ships of “apparatus
exclusively intended to facilitate navigation or communication” does not de-
prive the ships of the protections due them.52 Somewhat contradictorily, how-
ever, it is expressly forbidden for hospital ships to “possess or use a secret code
for their wireless or other means of communication.”53 It is this prohibition that
proves difficult to implement in this day and age.
Professor Richard Grunawalt has conducted an in-depth analysis of the ori-
gins of this prohibition.54 The rule derived from a desire to prevent conclusively
any further instances of hospital ships being used to signal and provide
nonmedical services to combatants, as had occurred during the Russo-Japanese
D A L T O N 2 5
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War of 1904–1905;55 such episodes recurred during World War I.56 Even as the
convention was being negotiated, it was recognized that a prohibition on the use
of secret codes by hospital ships would be difficult to implement in practice. So
the Diplomatic Conference recommended that the high contracting parties
draw up an international code regulating the use of “modern means of commu-
nication” between hospital ships and warships and military aircraft.57 Unfortu-
nately, of course, that code never came into being, and the high contracting
parties are left with the prohibition as it was drafted in 1949.
Interestingly, the equally authentic French text of the Convention contains a pro-
hibition only on the use of a secret code to transmit traffic, not to receive it.58 In ad-
dition, Article 28(2) of Additional Protocol I of 1977, concerning medical aircraft,
provides that such aircraft “shall not be used to collect or transmit intelligence data
and shall not carry any equipment intended for such purposes” but does not pro-
hibit the use of a secret code or encrypted communications to further the humani-
tarian mission of the aircraft.59 Additional Protocol I clearly takes a more realistic
approach that recognizes the developments in communications technology since
1949. The French text of the 1949 Convention also appears to recognize the neces-
sity for hospital ships to receive encrypted communications, at a minimum.
Professor Grunawalt’s study provides ample discussion of the problems in-
herent in the use of unencrypted communications by hospital ships, not least
the fact that U.S. federal privacy standards require that patient medical informa-
tion be transmitted over secure circuits if it is reasonable and appropriate to do
so.60 There are also practical security issues with transmitting patient informa-
tion, such as social security numbers, in the clear. With identity theft an ever-
growing concern, it would be unfortunate if wounded and injured personnel
were exposed to yet an additional risk as a consequence of being treated aboard a
hospital ship. Further, it has been reported that when the hospital ship USNS
Mercy (T-AH 19) deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in January
2003, it was equipped with encrypted communications systems.61 There is no
need to belabor here the point that the prohibition on use of a “secret code” by
hospital ships is anachronistic, unrealistic, and unworkable in today’s high-
technology environment, where satellite communications are both routinely
encrypted and routinely employed by military systems. Professor Grunawalt is
correct in recommending that the U.S. Navy formally abandon adherence to this
outdated requirement while reaffirming adherence to the underlying mandate
that hospital ships not be used for military purposes harmful to an adversary.62
The second vexation facing hospital ships is the need to arm them for force
protection against attacks like that against the destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) in
Aden Harbor in October 2000. Again, the Second Geneva Convention provides
the baseline legal requirement—and in this instance the basic rule is far more
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realistic than the one just discussed prohibiting the use of a secret code. Article
35(1) provides that arming the crews of hospital ships for the maintenance of
order, their own defense, or the defense of the sick and wounded does not de-
prive the ships of their protected status.63 That should end all debate, and the
Navy should not hesitate to man its hospital ships with security teams armed
with crew-served weapons—such as machine guns or grenade launchers for
close-in defense against attacks by terrorists or others who do not comply with
the law of armed conflict. Professor Grunawalt, however, aptly points out very
legitimate reasons for caution in deploying hospital ships bristling with defen-
sive armaments.64 On this topic, the San Remo Manual has taken a decidedly
anachronistic viewpoint by opining that hospital ships may be armed “only”
with “deflective” means of defense (such as chaff and flares) and “not with
means that could be used in offensive fashion, such as anti-aircraft guns.”65
Not only are chaff and flares ineffective against a determined suicide attack
like that launched against USS Cole, but the requirement as stated in the San
Remo Manual is nowhere found in the Geneva Conventions and is an unneces-
sary and untimely restriction of the plain letter of the law. Accordingly, Professor
Grunawalt rightly argues that in addition to crew-served weapons hospital ships
should be equipped with the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System or other
state-of-the art defensive antiair and antisurface weapons.66 While the Royal
Navy concurs that encryption equipment may be fitted in hospital ships “to as-
sist with the humanitarian mis-
sion,” it is not as supportive on the
arming issue. A Royal Navy offi-
cial told Jane’s Defence Weekly that
any armaments beyond small
sidearms “would compromise the protected status of the vessels” under current
international law.67 The Royal Navy approach at present, apparently due to bud-
getary rather than legal considerations—to develop more versatile platforms
that can accomplish other missions in addition to caring for the wounded and
sick—may be more in line with the U.S. Navy’s plans for sea basing.68
As Dr. Arthur M. Smith pointed out in a recent edition of this journal, “plans
for afloat casualty care and strategic evacuation may be dramatically altered”
under the Navy’s sea-basing concept.69 He suggests that commercially chartered
cruise ships or Military Sealift Command logistics ships might deliver troops
and equipment to the sea base and then be converted to casualty care. Further,
given the terrorist threat worldwide, aeromedical evacuation might represent a
more practical way to care for and evacuate the wounded than does evacuation
by hospital ships. Given that potential terrorists could view white ships with
large red crosses as attractive targets rather than as specially protected vessels,
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force protection alone could dictate developing flexible, multimission platforms
as substitutes for traditional white-hulled hospital ships. As Dr. Smith suggests,
combatant commanders will be redefining their casualty care and evacuation
requirements, and those requirements might not include ships like USNS Com-
fort and Mercy.70
THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND THE FUTURE OF
NAVAL WARFARE
Some have questioned whether the long-standing support of the U.S. Navy’s
leadership for American accession to the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982
continues to be in the best interests of the service and the United States. Some
have asked in particular whether the convention helps or hinders the Navy’s vi-
sion of sea basing. Throughout his term as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Clark never wavered from his strong position in favor of the convention. He tes-
tified before Senate committees on more than one occasion that the convention
is congruent with sea basing and “provides the stable and predictable legal re-
gime with which to conduct our operations today and in the future. Joining the
convention will support ongoing U.S. military operations, including continued
prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism.”71 The current CNO, Admiral
Mullen, follows the lead of Admiral Clark and a long line of distinguished prede-
cessors in his support of accession.72 It is this author’s opinion as well that the
Law of the Sea Convention preserves the nation’s ability to leverage fully the use
of the world’s oceans, providing as it does a body of widely accepted and recog-
nized law that protects navigational freedoms and American ability to operate
on the high seas.
First, the convention does not impair or inhibit the inherent right of self-
defense. It was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations and the pre-
cepts of the Charter, Article 51 of which clearly recognizes the inherent right of
self-defense. Second, the stipulation in the convention that “the high seas shall
be reserved for peaceful purposes” must be read in light of Article 58, which spe-
cifically reserves freedom of navigation and overflight and “other internation-
ally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms” to be enjoyed by all states.73
State practice over hundreds of years—by which the navies of the world have op-
erated and trained in waters seaward of other nations’ territorial seas, including
what is now recognized as their contiguous and exclusive economic zones—
confirms that military uses of the sea that do not violate Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter are lawful under customary international law.74
The Law of the Sea Convention reaffirms this position by limiting military
activities in only a few narrow circumstances, such as Article 19 regarding inno-
cent passage through the territorial sea. Moreover, the Resolution of Advice and
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Consent to Ratification approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
specifically provides that “the advice and consent of the Senate . . . is subject to
the following . . . understandings: (1) The United States understands that noth-
ing in the convention, including any provisions referring to ‘peaceful uses’ or
‘peaceful purposes’ impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense or rights during armed conflict.”75 The “peaceful purposes” provision of
the Law of the Sea Treaty creates no new rights or obligations and imposes no re-
straints on military operations or traditional uses of the seas, any more than
does the equivalent provision in the Outer Space Treaty, which provides that the
moon and other celestial bodies
shall be used “exclusively for peace-
ful purposes.”76 It has long been the
position of the United States that
“peaceful purposes” means “non-
aggressive” ones. Consequently, military activity not constituting the use of
armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political indepen-
dence of another nation, and not otherwise inconsistent with the United Na-
tions Charter, is permissible.77
Third, a word about innocent passage is in order. Some have argued that the
Law of the Sea Convention would negatively impact national security because
the innocent passage regime “prohibits” or makes “illegal” intelligence gather-
ing or submerged submarine operations within a coastal nation’s twelve-nautical-
mile territorial sea. What the critics do not recognize or acknowledge is that the
United States has been complying with the navigational provisions of the con-
vention since 1983. In his Ocean Policy Statement of 10 March 1983, President
Ronald Reagan announced that the Law of the Sea Convention “contains provi-
sions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which generally confirm ex-
isting maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all States” and
that the United States would “accept and act” in accordance with the balance of
interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans—such as navigation and over-
flight.” 78 Moreover, the nation is a party to the 1958 Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which contains innocent-passage provisions
similar to those in the Law of the Sea Convention, including that submarines in
innocent passage are “required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag.”79
Like the Territorial Sea Convention, the Law of the Sea Convention requires
that submarines engaged in innocent passage navigate on the surface and show
their flags.80 The Law of the Sea Convention, however, is an improvement over
the Territorial Sea Convention, in that it specifically delineates those activities
that may be considered prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the
coastal state—thus shielding the United States and other seagoing nations from
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efforts by coastal states to regulate other types of conduct in the territorial sea. It
declares “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence
or security of the coastal State” inconsistent with innocent passage and prejudi-
cial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state.81 Such activities are
not, however, deemed “illegal,” nor are they forbidden. The coastal state may
have national laws prohibiting such activities and may take necessary steps to
prevent passage that is not innocent;82 it may require a warship to leave the terri-
torial sea “immediately” if the ship disregards requests to comply with the state’s
laws and regulations concerning passage through the territorial sea.83 These pro-
visions reflect the carefully crafted balance that the United States sought in order
to protect its own interests as both a coastal state and a flag state. Thus, if a war-
ship or submarine transits through the territorial sea in innocent passage, it
must comply with the requirements for innocent passage. If it does not do so, the
coastal state, becoming aware of such non-innocent passage, may ask it to depart
the territorial sea immediately and then address the matter through diplomatic
channels.
Fourth, accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would in no way negatively
affect the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is a global effort
to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery
systems to and from states of proliferation concern. It is not a treaty or a formal or-
ganization. It is a cooperative effort to apply all the tools at the disposal of the PSI
partner nations—intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, military, customs
authorities, financial instruments—to prevent transfers of WMD-related items at
sea, in the air, or on land. More than sixty countries have indicated their support for
PSI—most, if not all, of them parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. While the
goal is “to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach” to preventing
proliferation, “actions taken in support of the PSI will be consistent with national
legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.”84 Certainly the in-
tent is to strengthen existing authorities where they are weak or inefficient, but only
within the bounds of national and international law, which includes the Law of the
Sea Convention. Numerous multilateral exercises have taken place. The PSI part-
ners had one publicly announced success, in the fall of 2003, when four nations (the
United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany) cooperated to interdict and
prevent a shipment of centrifuge parts to Libya.85
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
There is no doubt that the Navy’s plans for sea basing could give pause to allies and
potential competitors alike. After all, it is based on the notion that “America will
never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country.”86 Lieutenant
General James Mattis, head of the Marine Corps Combat Development
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Command, says the idea is to minimize the need for the U.S. military to rely on
allies to supply territory from which its forces can operate abroad.87 One hears
phrases like “using the sea as maneuver space,” exploiting “control of the seas,”
and, from a large display in the Pentagon in June 2005, the “command of the
commons.”88 Carried to its logical conclusion, sea basing will inevitably involve
the staging of large, floating military bases in the exclusive economic zones of
other nations, from which
joint forces and weapons
could be projected ashore
in a future conflict. Sea
basing also has a more be-
nign side. Vice Admiral Phillip Balisle, former commander of the Naval Sea
Systems Command, has pointed to the Navy’s tsunami-relief efforts in Indone-
sia, launched and directed from ships assembled offshore, as an example of sea
basing in action: “We have always had a sea base, or at least for many years.
What we’re talking about now is the shaping of that sea base for [a] 21st-century
environment.”89
Will the sea base impact the sovereignty of other nations, threaten their security,
or convert the oceans to “nonpeaceful” purposes? The answer is no. Each sea base
will be established consistent with principles of law applicable to the operation in
question—whether it be humanitarian relief operations, international armed con-
flict, or United Nations sanctions enforcement. Is it possible that other nations may
disagree with the United States over the applicable legal principles? Of course. Con-
flicts and disagreements will arise in the future, as they have in the past. One has
only to recall the EP-3 incident off Hainan Island in the People’s Republic of China
and the difference of opinion between Washington and Beijing over the propriety of
military activities conducted in a coastal state’s exclusive economic zone to realize
that there will often be differing interpretations of the applicable law.90
One might ask whether it would be advisable for the United States to attempt
to negotiate an agreement with China similar to the Incidents at Sea or the Dan-
gerous Military Activities agreements with the Soviet Union of 1972 and 1990.91
At the time of those agreements, both the United States and the USSR had sub-
stantial blue-water navies. Several dangerous incidents had occurred, and the
potential for unpredictable future confrontations existed around the world.
With China, in contrast, the potential for confrontation exists primarily
within that nation’s exclusive economic zone due to Chinese objections to such
U.S. military activities there as surveillance and military surveys. An existing
mechanism, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, is available, and it
is probably sufficient, given the limited area and scope of potential confronta-
tions, to address issues, concerns, and disagreements.92 In fact, it was presumably
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under the auspices of this agreement that Ambassador Joseph W. Prueher pro-
posed a meeting to discuss the EP-3 incident, suggesting that the agenda include
a “discussion of causes of the accident and possible recommendations whereby
such collisions could be avoided in the future.”93 Nonetheless, this author would
not rule out the value of a more comprehensive agreement, embodying special
signals like those in the IncSea Agreement, for indicating intentions and opera-
tions, if the consultations under the existing agreement prove unsuccessful in
preventing future dangerous encounters.
It is certainly appropriate that the United States continue to communicate with
its allies and potential competitors alike concerning plans for the U.S. Navy of
the future. Concerning all five of the issues discussed in this article, it would be
advisable to inform other nations of American intentions and to engage in a dia-
logue with them concerning the legal bases for U.S. actions. A cooperative, con-
sultative approach would be useful in obtaining the support and understanding
of potential coalition partners, as well as in alleviating the concerns of potential
competitors. In a recent speech to the Naval War College, the Chief of Naval Op-
erations stressed how important coalition partners will be to future naval opera-
tions.94 While President Bush has made it clear that the United States will not
jeopardize its national security by acquiescing to “the objections of the few,” it
appears his preferred modus operandi is to seek international support and inter-
national partnerships.95 The Proliferation Security Initiative alone is evidence
that the president wants to work with multinational partners to the maximum
extent possible. The issues discussed here represent ample opportunities for col-
laboration and cooperation on the international level.
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